The “Chinese Model” and crisis response across political systems
In her book Edge of Chaos: Why Democracy Is Failing to Deliver Economic Growth (2018), Dambisa Moyo, an economist and an author, characterizes China’s treatment of poverty as unprecedented. China, she argues, has moved 300 million people above poverty line in 30 years. On the other hand, it took the U.S. 57 years to double its per capita income. Moyo voices sound criticism of bureaucratic failures in liberal democracies. However, her remarks have also been taken as an apologia for authoritarianism! As the world confronts the spread of Coronavirus, a similar narrative has begun to circulate: China went through the crisis with 80 thousand cases and is leaving with only 3000 deaths, accredited to state response. Tedros Ghebreyesus, the Director-general of the World Health Organization, states that china has sat “a new standard for outbreak response.” Praise has also come from President Trump, tweeting: “great discipline is taking place in China.” In response to the outbreak, China implemented what might be seen as “extreme” measures including forced lockdown, quarantine for entire cities, suspension of travel and domestic traffic, and imposition of restrictions on individuals’ movement. Over weeks, China put millions under such restrictions. Today, it is recording, according to the Chinese authorities, low to zero cases.
The narratives about the “Chinese Model” turn into a debate concerning the effectiveness across political systems. Absence of checks and balances tend to render authoritarian systems effective. On the other hand, democracies seem crippled by fragmented power structures and expansive bureaucracies. Based on these generalizations, proponents of the Chinese response pose that response in the U.S. and Europe has been inadequate. The Chinese government also furthers its narrative about effectiveness; offering aid and expertise to other countries. Of course, there is much to be noted about the Chinese response. However, rushed conclusions risk turning into political propaganda; especially during a decade of democratic backsliding and the rise of populist and authoritarian-leaning leaders in some democracies. More importantly, these comparisons fall into what can be called “transparency trap” where numbers of cases and deaths are mistakenly taken as indicators of effectiveness while they may, in fact, be a result of disparity in transparency!
Anyway, the regime-type debate disregards that response is contingent on factors related to the virus such as infection rate, incubation period, number of tests per capita and the nature and distribution of clusters within each country. Response is also contingent on factors, more important than regime-type, like state capacity and social compliance. The debate also disregards the fact that political systems are not a binary of autocracy and democracy. There are a variety of systems with different degrees and aspects of both. Still, a general perspective can be developed where political and systematic aspects are incorporated into this debate.
Facing Coronavirus, the effectiveness of state response can be assessed, I contend, at two levels: First is the effectiveness of limiting the spread where states, based on modes of transmission of viral diseases, employ measures and tactics to limit increase in cases. Second is the effectiveness of crisis management where the state apparatus deals with the surge of patients and other effects of the crisis. The distinction between the two is intentional to mark that effectiveness of limiting the spread does not necessarily entail effective management. The latter is the stage where state institutions and healthcare system are tested.
LIMITING THE SPREAD
The “Chinese model” is defined by taking “extreme” measures including a total and enforced lockdown on Wuhan, the first epicenter of the virus. Other measures include quarantine for other areas, suspension of travel and domestic traffic, and restrictions on individuals’ movement. Recently, China has also declared a border shutdown, banning most foreign nationals with certain exceptions. Many states have followed the Chinese model and employed similar measures. Most democracies have limited response to travel bans and border shutdowns; refraining from total lockdown and forced quarantine for legal and crisis-related reasons. The closest are Stay-at-Home orders and travel advisories. Businesses have also contributed through measures such as limited working hours and to-go services.
China’s measures seem to emphasize a security-based framing of the crisis and have a large magnitude of effects on the targeted population. However, they seem, considering that person-to-person is the primary mode of transmission, effective. Needless to say, physical distancing is expected to decrease the likelihood of virus transmission. Nevertheless, the effectiveness of such measures lies not only in how aggressively enforced they are. Rather, it is, according to Bruce Aylward, the co-lead of the WHO-China Joint Mission, about how fast they are employed. Such argument is supported by the fact that fast and early stage response is easily employed; given the low number of cases and infected areas. Besides this, fast response limits the number of patients; enabling states to avoid being overwhelmed. Relatively, China’s measures were employed at the early stage. Hence, they were effective. But how effective such a model would be in other countries? Is the “Chinese model” meant to be only a Chinese model?
The effectiveness of the “Chinese model” faces different challenges when transferred to democracies. At one level, employing some of the Chinese measures is not feasible due to constitutional and legal mandates. For instance, the U.S. federal law, under section 361 of the Public Health Service Act, authorizes the U.S. Secretary of Health and Human Services “to take measures to prevent the entry and spread of communicable diseases from foreign countries into the United States and between states.” However, the enforcement of such measures might be hindered by the fragmented structure of the U.S. federal system. A manifestation of such condition is seen in Cuomo’s resistance to Trump’s idea of forced quarantine. The governor indicates, relying on state power, that he will not close the state borders. Another example is the case of Florida’s refusal to issue a Stay-at-Home order. Eight other states have also refrained from taking such action until this point.
Along with this, employing the Chinese measures is also difficult and not as effective for states where the virus is widespread. Those states have already been moved to the stage of crisis-management. Here, effectiveness is not only hampered by the level of spread but also by the timing of the Chinese response. While the Chinese government appears, as noted before, relatively fast in employing these measures within its borders, it was late in reporting on the crisis and its potential global spread. Indicators of the virus spread were reported by Dr. Li Wenliang on the 30th of December. Yet the Chinese government waited until mid-January before taking action. During this time, silent and unnoticed spread seem to have reached a global level. According to a recent report in The Washington Post, more than 430,000 travelers, on 1,300 direct flights, arrived from China to the U.S. since the emergence of the virus. Similar conditions were also happening at some of the European states. Of course, these conditions may constitute an intelligence failure on the side of the U.S. and Europe. Nevertheless, the timing of China’s response can still be directly linked to the current global magnitude of the crisis. It is as if the Chinese government has already undermined the model it promotes around the world!
The “Chinese model” seems also less effective when it is partially implemented. Partial lockdowns and quarantine appear less effective and, in certain cases, counterproductive; a condition that can be referred to as a reverse effect or a blowback of these measures. Essentially, the logic of control measures is to reduce traffic and interaction toward “flattening the curve.” In certain contexts, traffic volume is not reduced but rather compressed within the time frame allowed under partial lockdowns. Consequently, traffic compression, manifested in jammed streets and packed grocery stores, leads to more interaction and eventually to narrowing the curve! Such condition seems to be the case in some states where such measures have been employed partially. Upon noticing the reverse effect, these states have moved toward full lockdown. Nevertheless, it might also be late and less effective if the virus is widespread.
MANAGING THE CRISIS:
The Chinese management of the crisis is defined by extensions of control measures including setting up dedicated hospitals and treatment areas for the virus patients in isolation from general hospitals. Other measures include building temporary hospitals; technically turning stadiums, halls, and schools into treatment areas. At the micro level, health teams are assigned to detect potential carriers of the virus through checks such as body temperature. Generally, lack of cure has limited measures, as the case in other countries, to general care. Concerning effectiveness, these measures have been taken by a healthcare system that ranks, according to the WHO, as 141 out of 190 in 2019. The Chinese government has implemented several reforms for its healthcare system. Yet, its effectiveness is still limited. According to a report in The New York Times, China “has one general practitioner for every 6,666 people, compared with the international standard of one for every 1,500 to 2,000 people, according to the World Health Organization.” Such condition reflects on low levels of preparedness; especially at the front lines where response to the virus outbreak is critical.
However, the effectiveness of the “Chinese model” is difficult to judge without data and close observation. While numbers may reflect on the effectiveness of the control measures, assessment of effective management remains inaccessible. Negative outcomes or deaths might not be sufficient indicators of effective management due to concerns over transparency and the fact that control over outcomes is influenced by patients’ characteristics and limited to managing side effects. The difficulty of assessing effectiveness of management comes also from the fact that it goes beyond the regime type. It is based on other factors such as state capacity; defined in terms of the state ability to mobilize financial and human resources, guide national socioeconomic development, create consensus, and use threat of force. Interestingly, considering such factor establishes an equivalence between democratic and authoritarian systems. High state capacity is expected to factor into effective management of the crisis regardless of the regime type. Here, democratic states such as Taiwan and South Korea seem to be managing the crisis effectively. Both states are, according to different studies, of moderate to high state capacity. As for authoritarian systems, Iran represents a case of less effective management due to low state capacity. Hence, effective management is not limited to authoritarian systems.
Along with this, effective management is also based on social response and compliance with state measures. High levels of social compliance is expected to contribute to effective management. Here, regime-type comparisons may lend general expectations. Societies in authoritarian systems tend to comply under the domination of the norm or the threat of force. Evidence of the latter is seen in the Chinese case where measures are backed by force. On the other hand, societies in democratic systems tend to be less compliant with, and in some cases actively resistant to, state measures. An example is found in the U.S. where sensitivity and skepticism have delayed social compliance. In some cases, state measures have been criticized and challenged as in Florida’s attempt to shutdown the state beaches. Social compliance goes beyond regime-type. It is also subject to other factors such as public trust and social perception of threat. Both vary across different systems and social and cultural backgrounds. Generally, higher public trust in state institutions and heightened perception of threat tend to lend social compliance and even endorsement of aggressive measures.
Different patterns of effective management move the debate beyond the regime type and suspend judging the “Chinese model” until further investigation. However, reports on the Chinese healthcare system raise questions about such effectiveness. Besides this, studies speak of a decline in the Chinese state capacity. As for social compliance, China seems to have effectively induced such condition by force. However, reports, according to an article in The National Review, indicate a gradual erosion of public trust and rising criticism. The only possible conclusion: China’s effectiveness in limiting the spread has spared its system being overwhelmed, and in terms of effective management, being tested.
Finally, regime-type comparisons remain far from enough in assessing state response to the current crisis. Effectiveness is influenced by different factors and assessed at different levels. States may claim effectiveness in limiting the spread of the virus. However, effective management can only be claimed once state apparatus is vigorously tested. It is also the case when management of the current crisis sets standards and prepares the state and the world for upcoming challenges.
This article is available in Arabic HERE
